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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JAMES C. KIRBY, JR.*
I. DUE PROCESS

Eminent Domain-Just Compensation
II. EQUAL PROTECTION

1. Public School Segregation
2. Racial Exclusion From Licensing Board
3. Legislative Classiftcation
III. HOME RULE
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
V. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

1. Administrative Delegation-PublicHealth
2. Referendum
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Effect of PartialUnconstitutionalityof Statutes
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I. DUE PROCESS
Eminent Domain-Just Compensation.-Landowners sued the Ten-

nessee Commissioner of Highways and Public Works for compensation
for a taking of property for the state's superhighway program in
Brooksbank v. Leech.1 The trial court sustained a demurrer on the
ground that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.2 In order
to dispose of this question on appeal the supreme court first de* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University.
Lansden, Nashville, Tennessee.

Associate, Waller, Davis &

1. 332 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. 1959).
2. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides that "suits may be brought against the
state in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct." TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1702 (1956) provides that "no court in the state

shall have any power, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit against
the state, or against any officer of the state .

.

. with a view to reach the

state, its treasury, funds, or property, and all such suits shall be dismissed
as to the state or such officers, on motion, plea, or demurrer of the law officer
of the state, or counsel employed by the state." This statute codifies the rule
that actions brought against public officers in their own name are treated as
suits against the state if the rights of the state would be directly and
adversely affected by the judgment or decree sought, Automobile Sales Co.
v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38, 122 S.W.2d 453 (1938); General Oil Co. v. Crain,
117 Tenn. 82, 95 S.W. 824 (1906), aff'd, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). In an action for
the recovery of money from state funds, the state is the real party in interest
and may invoke its sovereign immunity even though individual officers are
the nominal defendants.

Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of

Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). The court in the instant case thus summarily
overruled the landowner's argument that his action was against the Commissioner individually and not against the state. 332 S.W.2d at 214-15.

1022

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

termined whether the legislature had provided an adequate statutory
method for just compensation, the absence of which would have
rendered the taking unconstitutional under both article I, section 21,
of the Constitution of Tennessee 3 and the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.4 The court held that the landowners'
remedy was by suit against the county where the taking occurred. 5
Until 1959, condemnation awards for state highway projects were
directed by statute to be paid from the general funds of the county
where the expenses were incurred.6 The state was made liable for
payment between itself and the county7 but was held not to be
liable at the suit of the landowner. 8 The landowner's sole remedy
was to obtain a judgment against the county, and if it lacked funds
for payment, he could obtain mandamus to compel the county to
levy a tax to satisfy the judgment. 9 A general eminent domain statute
enacted in 195910 now directs that awards be paid from the general
funds of the municipality, county or state, whichever is the condemner." However, the legislature did not specifically authorize suit
against the state to collect judgments when it is the condemner. 12
In the instant case, the court construed the 1959 laws strictly 13 and
in pari materiawith the other eminent domain statutes and held that
the legislature intended that landowners continue to collect damages
and compensation by suit against the county. This was held to be an
adequate method for just compensation, thus precluding suit against
the state. 14
3. Which provides "that no man's particular services shall be demanded,

or property taken or applied to public use, without the consent of his
representatives, or without just compensation being made therefor."

4. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

5. Roane County was made a defendant in the trial court after the
demurrer was sustained. However, a nonsuit was then taken as to the

county when the court denied a discretionary appeal pending disposition of

the county's liability.
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-506 (1956).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-511 (1956).
8. Phillips v. Marion County, 166 Tenn. 83, 59 S.W.2d 507 (1933); State
Dep't of Highways and Pub. Works v. Roseborough, 17 Tenn. App. 403, 68
S.W.2d 132 (M.S. 1933).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-921, -922 (1956); State Highway Dep't v.
Mitchell's Heirs, 142 Tenn. 58, 71, 216 S.W. 336 (1919).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1530, -1531 (Supp. 1960).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1540 (Supp. 1960).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-2004 (Supp. 1960), likewise enacted in 1959,
deals with acquisition of controlled access facilities and merely authorizes
"condemnation... in the same manner as now or hereafter may be authorized
by law."
13. Statutory authorization of suits against the state are strictly construed
and must specify the manner of bringing such action and designate the
court in which it may be brought in order to satisfy the provisions of article
I, section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution, quoted supra note 2. State ex
rel. Allen v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605, 106 S.W.2d 858 (1937).
14. It is not necessary that the provision for compensation be contained in
the statute authorizing the taking so long as there is adequate provision in the
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Any other interpretation of the eminent domain statutes would
have left the court with a difficult question in the Brooksbank case.
The legislature clearly had not authorized a suit against the state.15
If suit against the county had not been held to be available for a
taking by state highway agencies, the statutes authorizing such taking
would presumably have been held unconstitutional. The next question would then be the liability of a public officer who takes private
property under such a statute. No case has been discovered where a
public officer was held personally liable in damages for taking
property under an unconstitutional law. However, the statement is
generally made in decisions involving public utilities that purported
statutory authority to take private property without paying just
compensation is void and offers protection to no one.' 6
II. EQuAL PROTECTION
1. Public School Segregation.-In 1956 the Supreme Court of Tennessee followed Brown v. Board of Education7 and held unconstitutional Tennessee's laws providing for compulsory segregation in public schools.' 8 In 1957 the Tennessee legislature enacted several laws
concerning public school administration, one of which authorized
local school boards to provide separate schools for Negro and white
children whose parents or guardians voluntarily elect that they attend
segregated schools. 19 In Kelley v. Board of Education of the City of
Nashville,20 this statute was held unconstitutional by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Despite its element of free
choice between integrated and segregated schools, the statute provides for the maintenance of separate Negro and white schools from
which children of the opposite race are excluded. It therefore denies
equal protection under Brown v. Board of Education.
Probably more important, however, is the affirmance of the district
court's approval of the so-called "Nashville Plan" for desegregation of
schools by commencing with the first grade and adding one additional
grade each year. The plaintiffs' appeal had challenged the extension
of desegregation over a twelve year period as being unreasonably
long and violating the "all deliberate speed" mandate of the United
general laws. Louisville & N. R.R. v. City of Louisville, 131, Ky. 108, 114
S.W. 743 (1908).
15. See notes 12, 13 supra.
16. Payne v. Kansas City St. J. & C.B.R.R., 112 Mo. 6, 20 S.W. 322 (1892);
18 Am. JuR. Eminent Domain, § 130 (1938).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
18. Roy v. Brittain, 201 Tenn. 140, 297 S.W.2d 72 (1956).
19. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, ch. 11, § 1. By implication the separate schools
would be in addition to desegregated schools required by the above decisions.
20. 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1960).
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States Supreme Court.21 The district court had found that the local
school board had adopted the grade-a-year plan in good faith for
valid administrative and educational reasons. The record was such
that the court of appeals could not say that the district court's judgment approving the plan was clearly erroneous.2 2 However, the court
noted with approval that the district court had retained jurisdiction
of the case and indicated that future events might demonstrate that
more time was being taken than necessary and the district court could
then order acceleration of the plan.
The Kelley decision also approved the provision of the Nashville
plan which allows the voluntary transfer of both white and Negro
students who are assigned either to a school previously attended solely
by members of the opposite race or to a school in which the opposite
race is in the majority. Since the transfer provisions are equally
available to students of both races and do not exclude any child from
a school solely because of his race, they were upheld. The court
noted that Brown v. Board of Education does not compel integration
but only forbids compulsory segregation. If parents voluntarily choose
segregated schools for their children when nonsegregated schools are
23
available, no constitutional rights of the child are violated.
2. Racial Exclusion From Licensing Board.-An alleged scheme to
exclude Negro funeral directors and embalmers from membership on
a state licensing board was involved in Tennessee Negro Funeral
Directors Ass'n v. Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers.24
Sections 62-501 through 62-507 of the Code of Tennessee establish a
board for the licensing of funeral directors and embalmers, the
members of which are appointed by the Governor. As originally
enacted, 25 the statute provided that vacancies occurring on the board
21. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
22. The opinion of the court of appeals details the evidence at length and
reaches the following conclusion:
"The findings of the district court were sustained by the evidence. There
is no claim that the Board of Education did not act in good faith. The plan
is supported by practically all of the teachers in the schools. The reasons
for the support of the plan were clearly given by the Superintendent of
Schools, the former Superintendent of Schools, by the Acting Chairman of
the Board of Education, and by one of the most experienced principals and
teachers where the desegregation plan was operating. Among those reasons,
including difficulties arising from the recruitment of teachers, was the most
persuasive one-that children in the first grade had no sense of discrimination;
that as the classes of Negro and white children progressed year by year up
through high school, they would know no feelings of racial discrimination,
until the entire school system had been harmoniously integrated. One may
disagree with the gradual process, but we cannot say that such a plan is so
unreasonable that the judgment of the district court approving the plan, in
the light of the evidence before it, should be reversed as clearly erroneous."
270 F.2d at 228.
23. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
24. 332 S.W.2d 195 (Tenn. 1960).
25. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, ch. 13.
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should be filled by the Governor from a list approved and certified
to him by the State Association of Funeral Directors, whose membership is limited to the white race. Negro funeral directors sought an
adjudication that this provision was unconstitutional, alleging that its
effect would be to deny Negroes membership on the board. While
the action was pending, this provision was amended by the legislature26 to provide that vacancies were to be filled by appointment of
any person who met certain qualifications established by the act and
that the Governor was authorized to consider as qualified those per27
sons whose name appeared on a list certified by the same association.
The supreme court held that the amendment rendered the challenge
of the original provision moot. The court then viewed the new
provision as not being unconstitutional on its face and refused to
assume the truth of the plaintiffs' allegation that it would be administered so as to systematically exclude Negroes from membership
on the board. It could not be assumed either that the lists certified
by the association of white persons would not include the names of
any Negroes or that the Governor would limit his appointments to
those on the list since the amended act does not require, but merely
authorizes, appointment from the list.
Even though the court's expression of faith in the executive branch's
adherence to constitutional principles may turn out to be unwarranted, 28 the holding of the Funeral Directors case is in accord with
established principles of statutory construction. In considering constitutional questions, it is presumed that public officers will obey the
constitution, 29 and a court will not base a decision of unconstitutionality upon contingencies which may not arise.30 The holding in the
instant case is similar to the recent decisions upholding state pupil
placement acts against attacks which anticipate that they will be
administered so as to perpetuate school segregation. 31
3. Legislative Classification.-State legislation favoring pinball
machines over other gaming devices led to the invalidation of a city
26. TiwN.

CODE ANN. § 62-502 (Supp. 1960).
27. Did the amendment materially affect the constitutional issue? The
original act required appointment from the list certified by the all-white
association. As amended, it made inclusion on its list conclusive as to
qualification for appointment. In both instances the segregated association
was delegated a portion of the state's legislative power to determine the
membership of the board.
28. It would require proof of uniform and long-continued systematic exclusion of Negroes before the statute would become unconstitutional in its
application. Cf. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584 (1958).
29. State ex rel. Gallaher v. Hickman, 190 Tenn. 310, 229 S.W.2d 495 (1950).
30. Donathan v. McMinn County, 187 Tenn. 220, 213 S.W.2d 173 (1948).
31. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D.
Ala.), afj'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).

1026

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

ordinance in Smith Amusement Co. v. Mayor and Board of Commissioners of City of Chattanooga.32 The general gambling statutes
of Tennessee exempt pinball machines and their operation by express
33
exclusion from the definitions of "gambling device" and "gambling,"
but the City of Chattanooga passed an ordinance prohibiting the
possession and maintenance of pinball machines and then confiscated
and destroyed all such items. The trial court sustained a demurrer
to an action challenging the ordinance. On appeal, the supreme court
reversed and held the ordinance unconstitutional as being in conflict
with the general laws of the state. The state statutes were held to4
make the possession and operation of pinball machines lawful.3
The court rejected the city's argument that the exemption of pinball
machines from the state statute was discriminatory and unconstitutional, stating that "this was a matter for the legislature to determine"
and noting that such machines may be used for innocent purposes.
While a municipality may create offenses which are not offenses
against the state, it may not pass ordinances which violate the general
laws of the state or outlaw conduct expressly permitted by state law.35
The result then followed that the ordinance was ultra vires the city's
legislative authority.
III. HOME

RULE

The 1954 amendments to the Tennessee Constitution providing a
degree of home rule for cities and counties36 were considered in two
cases. Opposite results were reached for legislation affecting general
sessions courts and special school districts.
Durham v. Dismukes, 37 concerned the validity of special legislation
affecting the General Sessions Court for Sumner County. Chapter
203 of the Private Acts of 1957 increased the judge's salary and expanded the court's jurisdiction to include probate and juvenile jurisdiction. In accordance with the Home Rule Amendment 38 the statute
32. 330 S.W.2d 320 (Tenn. 1959).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2033 (Supp. 1960).

34. This holding was made prior to the legislation excluding pinball
machines as gambling devices. Heartley v. State, 178 Tenn. 254, 157 S.W.2d
1 (1941).
35. O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S.W. 449 (1908).
36. The general purpose of these amendments was to require local approval, by popular referendum or vote of the city or county legislative body,
of essentially local matters previously included in private acts of the state
legislature. For a general discussion of these amendments and their

background, see Hunt, Constitutional Law-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND.

L. REV. 763 (1954).
37. 333 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. 1960).
38. "[A]ny act of the General Assembly private or local in form or effect
applicable to a particular county or municipality either in its governmental
or its proprietary capacity shall be void and of no effect unless the act by
its terms either requires the approval by a two-thirds vote of the local
legislative body of the municipality or county, or requires approval in an
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was made dependent upon approval by the voters of Sumner County.
It was subsequently defeated in a special election. The judge of the
sessions court sought a declaratory judgment that the act nevertheless was effective, contending that its subject matter was not within
the purview of the Home Rule Amendment and that it became law
without the necessity of approval by the voters. 39 A decree that the
act was nullified by its defeat in the election was affirmed by the
supreme court.
The supreme court had previously held that circuit and chancery
courts are state courts and that legislation discontinuing their meetings at a city was not subject to home rule provisions,40 the principal
reasoning being that the salaries for the judges of such courts are
paid from state funds. General sessions courts, however, have generally been treated by judicial decisions as being local courts subject
to special or private legislation.41 Although the jurisdiction of general
sessions courts overlaps the jurisdiction of state courts and goes far
beyond that of the old justices of the peace which they displaced,
their judges' salaries are still paid from county funds and such
courts are regarded as essentially local in nature. In the Durham
case, the supreme court thus treated them as county courts subject
to the Home Rule Amendments, feeling that the need for creating
them or expanding their jurisdiction should properly be left to a vote
of the people in the local county.
School districts were not accorded treatment as local institutions
for home rule purposes. In Perrittv. Carter, a declaratory judgment
was sought that a private act 43 expanding a special school district in
Carroll County was void because it required approval of the voters
in the affected area rather than those of the entire county.44 The
supreme court held that the Home Rule Amendments did not apply
to special school districts, voided the election provision, and upheld
the validity of the act.45
election by a majority of those voting in said election in the municipality or
county affected." TEiNN. CONST. art. XI, § 9.

39. Had this contention been accepted, the success of his action would have
then depended upon whether the statute would have been upheld after voiding
the election provision. This question is discussed infra at page 1032.
40. State ex rel. Cheek v. Rollings, 202 Tenn. 608, 308 S.W.2d 393 (1957).
41. Freshour v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 409, 292 S.W.2d 705 (1956)); Hancock

v. Davidson County, 171 Tenn. 420, 104 S.W.2d 824 (1937). Juvenile courts
have been placed in the same category. State ex rel. Webb v. Brown, 132
Tenn. 685, 179 S.W. 321 (1915).
42. 325 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. 1959).
43. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1957, ch. 286.
44. Had the Home Rule Amendments been held applicable, the election
provisions evidently would have invalidated the statute. TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 9 makes legislation "void" unless approved by "a majority of those
voting in .. .said election in .. .the county affected."
45. The effect of elision of the election provision is discussed infra at page
1032.
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At first blush, the Perritt decision may appear to be an undesirable
limitation of the scope of the Home Rule Amendments by removing
from their operation something so seemingly local in nature as a
special school district. However, for the amendment to apply to a
particular legislative act it must not only be "private or local in form
or effect," but must also be "applicable to a particular county or
municipality, either in its governmental or its proprietary capacity. '46
Regardless of its essentially local impact, if the statute does not affect
a county or city as such, it is not subject to home rule.
The court relied principally in Perrittupon the recent holding that
sanitary utility districts are not subject to home rule47 and prior
decisions that school districts do not have the legal status of municipal
corporations but are instrumentalities of the state subject to unlimited control of the legislature.4 8 It seems evident that legislation
which concerns only an existing school district does not have the
effect upon a county or municipality contemplated by the Home Rule
Amendment. But the private act excluded from home rule by Perritt
resulted in the expansion of a school district, which apparently
brought within it areas whose schools were previously administered
by the county or other governmental agencies. Legislation concerning
the administration of city or county educational systems has generally been held to affect the county or city in its governmental
capacity,49 and therefore, to be permissible as special legislation unless violative of the general law of the state. 50 Furthermore, a county
in which a school district is expanded may find that the school district
becomes the owner of the county's school properties without assuming any bonded indebtedness arising from such properties. 51 It would
thus appear that expansion of a school district might well affect
46. Supra note 38.
47. Fountain City Sanitary Dist. v. Knox County Election Comm'n, 203

Tenn. 26, 308 S.W.2d 482 (1957).

48. Kee v. Parks, 153 Tenn. 306, 283 S.W. 751 (1926); Quinn v. Hester, 135
Tenn. 373, 186 S.W. 459 (1916). However, it was held that a school district
is "in the same class with counties and occupies the same legal status" for
purposes of immunity from suit in Barrett v. City of Memphis, 196 Tenn. 590,
269 S.W.2d 906 (1954).

49. Baker v. Milam, 191 Tenn. 54, 231 S.W.2d 381 (1950); Davidson County

v. City of Nashville, 190 Tenn. 136, 228 S.W.2d 89 (1950); State ex rel. Bales v.
Hamilton County, 170 Tenn. 371, 95 S.W.2d 618 (1935); Knox County v.

State ex tel. Nighbert, 177 Tenn. 171, 147 S.W.2d 100 (1940); Hamilton County
v. Bryant, 175 Tenn. 123, 132 S.W.2d 639 (1939). But see State ex tel. Scandlyn v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30, 281 S.W. 925 (1926).
50. State ex rel. Smith v. City of Chattanooga, 176 Tenn. 642, 144 S.W.2d
1096 (1940).
51. See Prescott v. Town of Lenox, 100 Tenn. 591, 47 S.W. 181 (1898);
Robertson v. Town of Englewood, 174 Tenn. 92, 123 S.W.2d 1090 (1939).
Apparently for this reason, the statute authorizing municipal annexation
without the vote of the area to be annexed provides for compulsory arbitration
to settle the rights of affected governmental units, school districts and
utility districts in the allocation or conveyance of their assets and liabilities.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-318 (Supp. 1960).
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the county in which it is located in both the county's governmental
and proprietary capacities and therefore be properly subject to home
rule proceedings. This question was not considered in Perritt and
apparently was not raised. If it arises in the future, the instant case
should not be considered as a controlling precedent.
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
The urban voters of Tennessee entered the final phase of their
struggle to secure judicial relief from the unconstitutional apportionment of representation in the state's legislature. Despite the express
command of the state constitution that reapportionment be ac52
complished according to enumeration of voters every ten years,
apportionment of the Tennessee Legislature has not changed since
1901.53 In 1956, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the rights
of proportional representation guaranteed by the state constitution
were denied to urban voters but the court declined to grant any
relief under state law.54 The court applied the traditional rule of
judicial self-limitation and held that the enforcement of such constitutional provisions is left to the conscience of the legislative
branch. 55 In Baker v. Carr,56 the plaintiffs sought a declaration that
the Reapportionment Act of 1901 and subsequent inaction of the
Tennessee Legislature violate the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. They alleged debasement of voting rights and denial of equal
representation with resulting discriminatory and inequitable allocation of state taxes and expenditures. The remedy sought was either
an injunction requiring state election officials to elect the next legislature from the state at large, or an injunction directing an election
under an up-to-date apportionment formula. A special three judge
federal district court followed the traditional view of judicial nonintervention and dismissed the suit. The court held first, that an
election at large would be equally violative of the Constitution of Tennessee, which specifically requires that such elections be based upon
counties and districts, and second, that the court could not practically direct and supervise statewide elections based upon newly
52. TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 4-6.
53. The 1901 act is now TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to -107

(1956).

54. Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 282, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). Discussed in Sanders, Constitutional Law1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1002

(1957).

55. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1956); People ex rel. Fergus v.
Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930); Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437,
164 N.E. 665 (1929); Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 172 P.2d 397 (1946).

56. 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). The decision of Judge Miller
upholding the court's jurisdiction, and convening the three-judge court is
reported at 175 F. Supp. 649 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
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apportioned election districts.
As this article is written, an appeal is pending in the United States
Supreme Court 7 and the final chapter in this frustrating struggle for
constitutional rights may be written during the next survey period.
As yet, no workable judicial remedy has been advanced by which the
courts can grant relief in this area, which is of course the primary
58
reason for the courts' inaction.
The court, in Baker v. Carr,was most impressed by the view of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee that judicial relief could not be granted
without completely disrupting, if not destroying, the government of
the state.5 9 It may be logically urged that the courts should merely
adjudge the unconstitutionality of present apportionment and trust
the legislature to then perform its duty and carry out reapportionment. In view of the long standing refusal of a majority of the
legislature to follow their clearly defined constitutional duty, it can
be understood why the court would hesitate to render a bare declaration of unconstitutionality with no clear remedy to be applied if the
legislature ignores the court as it has ignored the constitution. However, this course has been followed successfully in some instances.6 0
On the other hand, it now seems clear in Tennessee and many other
states 61 that unlawful deprivation of proportional representation to
urban citizens will continue indefinitely unless the courts can fashion
a judicial remedy. If convinced of this, the Supreme Court of the
United States may employ the same initiative and flexibility in its
equity powers as has been used in the school segregation cases and
thus fill this vacuum in our system of constitutional government.

V. DELEGATION

OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

1. Administrative Delegation-PublicHealth.-Broad delegations of
legislative power to a County Board of Health were challenged in
57. 28 U.S. L. WEEK 3358 (U.S. May 26, 1960).
58. Although usually characterized by such terms as "political question,"
"judicial self-limitation," or "non-intervention," one writer has candidly
labeled the basis of these holdings as "judicial incompetence." Frank,
Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 36 (Cahn ed. 1954).
59. Kidd v. McCanless, supra note 54.
60. This procedure resulted in legislative reapportionment in Minnesota.
Magrew v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958), 163 F. Supp. 184
(1958), 177 F. Supp. 803 (1959). It has also been undertaken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 161 A.2d 705, 712
(N.J. 1960), in which the court stated: "A judiciary, conscious of the sacrosanct quality of its oath of office to uphold the Constitution, cannot accept
an in terrorem argument based upon the notion that members of a co-equal
part of the government will not be just as respectful and regardful of the
obligations imposed by their similar oath. Any less faith on our part would
be an unbecoming and unwarranted reflection on the Legislature."

61. See Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71

HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062 (1958).
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Gamble v. State,62 a criminal prosecution of a parent for violating a
regulation of the board requiring polio immunization of school children. The enabling statute authorized the board to institute such
regulations as it deemed necessary "for the protection of the public
health. ' 63 In affirming the conviction of the defendant, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee upheld this delegation over the argument that it
lacked requisite standards to guide and limit the exercise of the
delegated power. Many cases have similarly upheld broad delegations
in matters pertaining to the public health and safety.64 At least one
court has candidly admitted that such delegations are "an exception
''
to the general doctrine of constitutional legislation."
The Gamble case also raised the question of delegation of power
to impose criminal penalties. Section 14 of the enabling statute made
violation of a rule of the County Board of Health punishable as a
misdemeanor and set minimum and maximum penalties to be assessed upon conviction. Administrative creation of crimes or impositions of criminal penalties are generally forbidden,6 but the
legislature may authorize an agency to issue regulations, the violation
of which the legislature declares to be criminal and for which it
67
prescribes penalties to be assessed by a court.
2. Referendum.-The validity of a private act which depended upon
a favorable election by the voters of the affected municipality was
involved in Halmontaller v. City of Nashville.68 This was an action
brought by firemen and policemen of the City of Nashville seeking
back pay for a period during which the city had failed to put them
on a five day work week along with other city employees. A 1949
private act 69 had directed that the City of Nashville hold a referendum
to determine if its voters wished city employees placed on a five day
week, in which event the Mayor and City Council were directed to
carry out the voters' mandate. The election results were affirmative
62. 333 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1960). The Home Rule Amendments to the Tennessee Constitution, article XI, section 9, now authorize precisely this type
legislation, supra at 1026, but the private act involved here was enacted prior
to these amendments.
63. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1909, ch. 339, § 7.
64. State v. Martin & Lipe, 134 Ark. 420, 204 S.W. 622 (1918); State ex
rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 308 P.2d 537 (1957); Brodbine v.
Inhabitants of Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N.E. 607 (1903).
65. Board of Health of Weekhawken Township v. New York Cent. R.R.,
4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950).

66. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); People v. Grant, 242 App.

Div. 310, 275 N.Y.S. 74 (1934); Board of Harbor Comm'rs v. Excelsior Red-

wood Co., 88 Cal. 491, 26 Pac. 375 (1891); Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah
404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936). See Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation
and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 51 (1943).
67. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); People v. Blanchard, 288
N.Y. 145, 42 N.E.2d 7 (1942).
68. 332 S.W.2d 163 (Tenn. 1960).

69. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1949, ch. 705.
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but firemen and policemen were not put on a five day week until
almost two years after other city employees. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee sustained the city's demurrer to the action, holding the
act invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the will of the people.
0
in which
The court replied principally on Wright v. Cunningham,7
an amendment to an act prohibiting open grazing in a class of
counties made the act applicable only to counties which "adopted"
it by majority vote at a special popular election. This referendum
provision was held unconstitutional. The Wright opinion had rejected holdings of other jurisdictions that the legislature may make
approval by popular vote a contingency upon which legislation becomes effective and made the further sweeping declaration that "no
legislative act can be so framed as that it must derive its efficacy
from a popular vote."'71 The Wright case was subsequently distinguished and limited by Clark v. State ex rel. Bobo,72 which upheld
local liquor options. Clark limited the Wright holding to invalidating
a referendum which decides whether or not a proposed statute will
become law and held that Wright's prohibition does not apply to
legislation which is so drawn as to be complete in itself and which
is operative through the entire state with only its local effect left to
popular vote in particular counties. Although it was not discussed,
the Halmontallerholding is in accord with the distinction drawn by
the Clark case since the enabling act was not self-executing but depended upon the municipal referendum to bring it into operation.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Effect of Partial Unconstitutionality of Statutes.-In Perritt v.
Carter,73 which is also discussed herein under "Home Rule," the
Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld a private act authorizing the
expansion of a school district after eliding a provision of the act
making its effectiveness dependent upon the result of a referendum. 4
The court relied upon Fountain City Sanitary Dist. v. Knox County
Election Comm'n,7 5 where it had reached the same result for a private
act expanding a utility district. The Perritt opinion does not discuss
the fact that the statute upheld in Fountain City contained a separability clause while that in Perritt contained none. Prior cases have
70. 115 Tenn. 445, 91 S.W. 293 (1905).
71. 115 Tenn. at 468, 91 S.W. at 298.
72. 172 Tenn. 429, 113 S.W.2d 374 (1938).
73. 325 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. 1959).

74. The doctrine of elision allows the upholding of a statute despite the

invalidity of a portion thereof where a complete legislative enactment remains without the stricken provision and it appears clearly that the legislature
would have enacted the statute without such a provision. Davidson County v.
Elrod, 191 Tenn. 109, 232 S.W.2d 1 (1950); Edwards v. Davis, 146 Tenn. 615,
244 S.W. 359 (1922).
75. 203 Tenn. 26, 308 S.W.2d 482 (1957).
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held that the absence of a separability clause creates a presumption
that the legislature did not intend the enactment to become effective
without all its provisions,7 6 and that in any case the doctrine of
elision is to be applied with "hesitation. '77 Also, there was evidence
in Fountain City that the election provision was inserted only in the
event that it was held that sanitary districts were subject to the
Home Rule Amendments, a fact not shown to have been in the record
in Perritt. Apparently much school district legislation, such as bond
issues, has been made dependent upon popular approval. 78 It may
therefore be questioned whether the legislature intended the statute
involved in Perrittto take effect without the prescribed approval by
referendum.
2. Formal Requirements for Repealing Acts.-A series of private
acts concerning the salary of the General Sessions Judge for Bedford
County was before the Supreme Court of Tennessee in English v.
79
Farrar.
The most recent act was construed as repealing by implication all prior enactments on the subject. However, this act did not
refer expressly, in either its caption or body, to the prior enactments
which were repealed by it. The court then sustained the act over the
objection that it violated the provisions of article II, section 17, of
the Tennessee Constitution concerning repealing acts. 80 It was established by prior cases that an act which merely repeals prior legislation by necessary implication from its provisions need not expressly
refer to the title or substance of such prior enactments. 81 This constitutional provision applies only to an act which expressly purports
to be a repealing act, which must then recite the title or substance
of the prior acts which are repealed. This requirement is strictly
applied once it is determined to be applicable.82 The result is that
repeals by implication, which are not favored in other contexts, are
much more free of formal constitutional restrictions than are express
repealing acts.83
76. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W.2d 151
(1939).
77. Mensi v. Walker, 160 Tenn. 468, 475, 26 S.W.2d 132, 135 (1930).

78. Kee v. Parks, 153 Tenn. 306, 315, 283 S.W. 751 (1926).
79. 332 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. 1960).

80. "All acts which repeal, revive or amend former laws shall recite in
their caption, or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revived or amended."
81. Clark v. State ex rel. Bobo, 172 Tenn. 429, 113 S.W.2d 374 (1938);
Brown v. Knox County, 187 Tenn. 8, 212 S.W.2d 673 (1948).
82. In Melvin v. Bradford Special School Dist., 186 Tenn. 694, 212 S.W.2d
668 (1948), an act captioned "To Abolish all Special School Districts in Gibson County" was held to be unconstitutional because it failed to expressly
recite the title or substance of the prior acts creating the school districts.
83. The preceding provision of article II, section 17, requiring that all
bills contain only one subject which shall be expressed in its title has been
liberally construed, lest useful legislation be unnecessarily embarrassed.
Goetz v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451, 278 S.W. 417 (1925). See Note, Constitutional
Provisions Regulating The Mechanics Of Enactment In Tennessee, 5 VAm. L.
REV. 614 (1952).

